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The late Ralph Santiago Abascal, who worked for years out of Cali-
fornia Rural Legal Services and became one of the most admired legal
service attorneys of his generation, was co-counsel in a celebrated envi-
ronmental justice victory, El Pueblo Para Aqua y Aire Limpio v. County
of Kings. ' El Pueblo successfully blocked the proposed siting of a haz-
ardous waste incinerator by holding that the project's proponents had
not translated the public review documents into Spanish in a majority
monolingual Spanish-speaking community. Despite this victory, how-
ever, Abascal later observed, "The handful of reported environmental
justice cases that have raised civil rights claims have been litigated un-
der the wrong theories." Instead of the "difficult" theory of Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection, Abascal argued, lawyers seeking to achieve
environmental justice should bring claims under federal statutes designed
to insure equal property rights. In particular, he advocated bringing en-
vironmental justice claims under Tittle VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968, commonly known as the Fair Housing Act ("FHA").' The FHA is,
he suggested, the "statute with perhaps the broadest reach" in environ-
mental justice cases.'
This essay will explore Abascal's suggestion, looking in particular at
both FHA claims and possible claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1982. At
the outset, it bears emphasizing that no reported cases have successfully
advanced such claims in the environmental justice context. However, if
carefully drawn, cases using these statutes could help achieve important
environmental justice victories. There is another advantage to using these
federal property rights statutes to achieve environmental justice. Spe-
cifically, the most likely success under these statutes will occur when the
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San Diego. He can be contacted at colinc@tjsl.edu or (619) 297-9700, ext. 1520.
Professor Crawford presented this essay at a panel on Environmental Justice at
the 61st National Lawyers Guild Convention in Detroit in October 1998. It is a
much-modified and -condensed version of a chapter in Michael Gerrard, ed.,
THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (American Bar Association)(1999).
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federal property rights claims are brought as part of a coordinated com-
munity development strategy. Too often, "environmental" issues such
as the siting of noxious industrial uses are considered in isolation from
other public interest goals. The federal property protection statutes pro-
vide one avenue to avoid such intellectual ghetto-ization, and thus make
environmental claims an integral part of activists' community organiz-
ing goals.4
II. FHA Claims. 5
The FHA was enacted both to end discrimination in residential hous-
ing and to end segregated housing patterns. Both purposes should be
kept in mind when considering the possible usefulness of FHA claims in
the environmental justice context (especially the FHA's pro-integration
aim, which is often neglected amid efforts to secure better quality hous-
ing for persons protected by the law.)
Three sections of the FHA present themselves as potentially useful in
an environmental justice lawsuit. The first such section is 42 U.S.C.
Section 3604(a), which makes it unlawful "[t]o refuse to sell or rent after
the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or
rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any per-
son because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national ori-
gin." A central question raised by case law interpreting this section is
who can be sued under it. Clearly, the section applies to municipal au-
thorities and private providers of housing services. Thus, for instance,
zoning decisions have been held to fall within the ambit of Section
3604(a).6
The harder question is whether this phrase also applies to municipal
authorities and private parties not directly involved in the provision of
housing services-such as an agency responsible for environmental per-
mitting or a private developer of a waste disposal facility. The Seventh
Circuit has confirmed that "although Section 3604(a) applies principally
to the sale or rental of dwellings, courts have construed the phrase 'oth-
erwise make unavailable or deny' in subsection (a) to encompass mort-
gage 'redlining,' insurance redlining, racial steering, exclusionary zon-
ing decisions, and other actions by individuals or governmental units
which directly affect the availability of housing to minorities. '7
However, this dictum in turn raises the question of what "other ac-
tions" might be said directly to affect housing availability. Regrettably,
this has not been definitely answered by the courts, although there is a
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basis for concluding that defendants uninvolved in the provision of ser-
vices but whose actions affect housing availability are reachable by the
section.8 One clear lesson that emerges from the case law, however, is
that plaintiffs must establish that defendants have acted so as to make
housing unavailable. For instance, plaintiffs in a Brooklyn, New York
case mis-stepped when they argued that the City of New York discrimi-
nated against the largely African-American residents of the Bedford-
Stuyvesant neighborhood by placing a disproportionate number of home-
less shelters there. The court held that plaintiffs not only failed to estab-
lish their factual case, they also erred because they maintained that the
concentration of shelters endangered the health of and access to public
education in the community. Threats to such community activities are
not, the court suggested, the concern of the FHA.9 Simply put, plaintiffs
therefore need to understand that Section 3604(a) is not a general land
use reform statute; claims under the section instead must concentrate on
demonstrating that a plaintiff has been discriminated against in an effort
to secure housing.
Plaintiffs drafting pleadings under Section 3604(a) should remember
the law's pro-integration purpose. For example, the I Ith Circuit ruled
that it might well violate Section 3604(a) if a housing project was lo-
cated in a neighborhood dominated by people of color when most resi-
dents of the housing project would also be people of color.° In the envi-
ronmental justice context, it is possible to imagine a situation where,
similarly, the siting of an undesirable land use would have the effect of
further segregating the residential property in an area, and therefore con-
stitute an FHA violation. This might be true even if it was established
that racial and ethnic minorities "came to the nuisance" when they moved
into an area with a number of undesirable land uses (because of lower
property costs.)"
The second FHA section potentially useful to an environmental jus-
tice advocate is 42 U.S.C Section 3604(b), which, in relevant part, pro-
hibits discrimination in the "terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or
rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in con-
nection therewith." As with much FHA case law, there is considerable
judicial disagreement as to the proper reading of the statutory language.
One interpretive debate of consequence for environmental justice advo-
cates concerns the proper reading of the above-quoted phrase. The nar-
rower reading holds that the words "terms, conditions and privileges"
necessarily modify the entire phrase "sale or rental of a dwelling"; a
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broader reading would lead one to understand that the section applies to
any discrimination in terms, conditions and privileges related to dwell-
ings. For environmental justice advocates, the preferred reading clearly
would be the broader one, since it would not restrict environmental jus-
tice challenges under the statute solely to situations involving sales and
rentals of realty. Unfortunately, the most widely-adopted view is that the
narrower reading is correct. 2 Nonetheless, even if the narrower reading
of the statutory language is adopted, discriminatory sales and rental ac-
tivities are likely to occur during the course of an environmental justice
controversy, raising possible causes of action under the statute. More-
over, it should be remembered that the narrower reading of the statute is
not the only and inevitable interpretation of the section.
Those considering possible causes of action under Section 3604(b),
should be aware courts have held that owners and renters of already-
acquired property can bring actions under the section in order to protect
"intangible" property interests.13 It is easy to imagine circumstances where
one seeking to advance environmental justice goals could use such a
reading of Section 3604(b). For example, 3604(b) might be used by an
African-American property owner who opposed a proposed hazardous
waste incinerator in her neighborhood on the grounds that the project
would discriminate against her in the "terms, conditions and privileges
of sale" of her dwelling. Similarly, an Asian-American tenant could
invoke Section 3604(b). Additionally, a Latino-American owner or ten-
ant residing in an area through which hazardous materials were routinely
transported might seek protection under Section 3604(b).
Another important interpretive question raised by the language of Sec-
tion 3604(b) concerns the meaning of the words "services or facilities."
Again, there is no consensus as to the meaning of this phrase. Although
a county's holding of tax deeds was not deemed a "service or facility"
subject to FHA scrutiny, 4 mortgage financing, insurance redlining and
similar financial activities have been held to be covered by Section 3604's
anti-discrimination provisions, as have exclusionary zoning practices.' 5
Moreover, Department of Housing and Urban Development regulations
give an even more extensive list, including recreational and parking fa-
cilities, and cleaning and janitorial services.' 6 For the environmental
justice advocate, the broader the reading of the phrase "service or facil-
ity" the better, especially inasmuch as likely defendants in an environ-
mental justice lawsuit may not be involved directly in the provision of
housing services.
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For example, a Section 3604(b) claim might have been advanced suc-
cessfully in a much-scrutinized environmental justice case such as Bean
v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp.7 In Bean, the Texas Depart-
ment of Health permitted the location of a solid waste disposal facility
near homes and churches in a largely African-American neighborhood
that, plaintiffs claimed, was already disproportionately burdened with
such facilities. In dicta, the Bean court observed, "It simply does not
make sense to put a solid waste site so close to a high school, particularly
one with no air-conditioning. Nor does it make sense to put the land site
so close to a residential neighborhood."' 8 Plaintiffs nonetheless lost
because they could not demonstrate discriminatory intent. Conceivably,
however, they might have won under Section 3604(b) if they could have
shown a disparate impact that was racially discriminatory (by limiting or
adversely affecting housing opportunities) in the exercise of the "ser-
vice" of waste disposal permit issuance.
The third FHA section possibly useful to environmental justice law-
yers is 42 U.S.C. Section 3617, which prohibits coercion, intimidation,
or interference with one who either provides housing opportunities or
helps another secure rights guaranteed by the FHA. Typically, Section
3617 is pled only in connection with other FHA claims (because it re-
lates to alleged deprivation of FHA rights), although this is not required. 19
It should be noted that some courts require actual acts of physical intimi-
dation or coercion to trigger the section's application." However, at
least one federal court of appeals declined to read the section narrowly,
finding that physical coercion was not required to sustain a Section 3617
claim. "
If Section 3617 is read broadly, its value to environmental justice liti-
gants is enormous, so long as the rights interfered with are present and
not merely prospective. This is because the section creates a cause of
action for "interference" with the exercise of FHA rights. In addition,
for purposes of Section 3617, potential defendants need not be housing
providers. 22 Thus, for instance, a city's refusal to help housing develop-
ers construct integrated developments was found to constitute a Section
3617 violation.23 Similarly, a local ordinance that interfered with the
rights of low-income housing developers to help create housing opportu-
nities for African-Americans was found to violate both Sections 3604(a)
and 3617.24
A Section 3617 claim might thus be advanced in an environmental
justice case challenging a permit for an undesirable land use or rezoning
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of an area to allow for the siting of undesirable land uses, where those
actions interfered with efforts to provide a neighborhood predominantly
made up of people of color with adequate housing opportunities. Alter-
natively, Section 3617 claims might be available, for example, to oppose
neighbors who favored siting of a waste incinerator instead of housing.
III. Section 1982 claims
42 U.S.C. Section 1982 guarantees all citizens "the same right.., as
is enjoyed by white citizens ... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and
convey real or personal property." This law is narrower than the FHA
claims discussed above in that it is limited only to cases of racial and
ethnic discrimination. In addition, the potential utility of Section 1982 is
limited for the prospective environmental justice plaintiff because viola-
tions of the statute's strict standing requirements, and because it requires
proof of discriminatory intent. 25 However, it is much broader than the
FHA in that it applies not only to residential realty, but also to commer-
cial realty and personalty. Th6&, for instance, claims might be available
under Section 1982 for people of color residing in a heavily industrial-
ized area where personal or real property was damaged from excessive
particles or dust, if one demonstrated that white neighborhoods were not
similarly disadvantaged.26 Central to a Section 1982 claim, it must be
emphasized, is a showing that people of color have been intentionally
discriminated against in their efforts to secure contract or property rights.
For example, if a street closing "severely restricted access to black homes,"
preventing African-Americans from using their property, Section 1982
would be violated.27 Thus, "a siting that lowered neighboring property
values, or that restricted 'access' to neighboring homes by making them
unsafe would come within the purview of Section 1982."28
A Section 1982 claim was allowed to proceed in a case where the
plaintiffs alleged that the selection of locations for public housing projects
intentionally perpetuated segregated housing pattems.29 Another claim,
in which an African-American plaintiff alleging a Section 1982 viola-
tion on the grounds that his second mortgage application was rejected
because of mortgage redlining was allowed to proceed,3" as were allega-
tions that municipal redevelopment plans would destroy historically Af-
rican-American neighborhoods.3'
What all of these cases teach the environmental justice advocate is
that, so long as plaintiffs can demonstrate an intention to disadvantage




The late Ralph Santiago Abascal's suggestion that environmental jus-
tice advocates use federal property protection statutes-and especially
Title VIII-remains as provocative and untested as when he made it in
1995. However, environmental justice lawyers should not hesitate to
contemplate the use of such claims, particularly in the context of a more
broad-based community development effort that seeks to avoid the dis-
proportionate location of noxious, undesirable land uses in communities
of color.
NOTES
1 22 ENVTL L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,357 (Cal App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1991).
2 42 U.S.C. Secs. 3601-3631 (1998).
3 Ralph Santiago Abascal, Tools for Combating Environmental Injustice in the Hood:
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 345 (1995).
4 To this end, poverty lawyers serving communities of color would do well to consult
an issue of Clearinghouse Review largely devoted to housing advocacy. In combi-
nation with Abascal's article, id., the issue offers useful perspectives. Consolidated
Plan and Community Development Block Grant Advocacy, 32 CLEARINGHOUSE RE-
VIEW 171-215 (1998).
5 For comprehensive treatment of many of the questions raised in property rights
litigation, readers should look at one or both of the following treatises: Robert G.
Schwemm, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION (Clark Boardman 1990
& 1997 Supp.); James A. Kushner, FAIR HOUSING: DISCRIMINATION IN REAL ESTATE,
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND REVITALIZATION (McGraw Hill 2d ed. 1995 & West
Supp. 1998). See also Florence Wagman Roisman and Philip Tegeler, Improving
and Expanding Housing Opportunities for Poor People of Color: Recent Develop-
ments in Federal and State Courts, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 312 (1990); THE
FAIR HOUSING ACt AFrER TWENTY YEARS (Robert G. Schwemm, ed.,Yale Law School,
1989).
6 Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558
F.2d 1283, 1288-90 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1025, 54 L.Ed.2d 772,
98 S.Ct. 752 (1978) (Title VIII violation found where a zoning decision had
discriminatory effect).
7 Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass'n v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207,
1209 (7th Cir. 1984)[citing Halet v. Wend Investment Co., 672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.
1982) (discriminatory rental decisions).]
8 See, e.g. Southend, supra note 7 at 1210 (county's holding of properties by tax deed
and subsequent failure to maintain them not "other actions" covered by Section
3604(a)); Phillips v. Hunter Trails Community Ass'n, 685 F.2d 184, 187-190 (7th
Cit. 1982) [neighbors motivated by racial discrimination who bought property spe-
cifically so that it could not be bought by others violated 3604(a).] But see
Michigan Protection and Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 344-345 (6th
Cir. 1994) [neighbors who bought a house so that mentally disabled individuals
could not live there demonstrated "normal economic competition" and did not vio-
using federal property rights laws for environmental justice 161
late 3604(a).1
9 Coalition of Bedford-Stuyvesant Block Association, Inc. v. Cuomo, 651 F. Supp.
1202, 1208 & n.2 (E.D..N.Y. 1987).
10 Jackson v. Okaloosa County, 21 F3d 1532, 1543-1544 (11th Cir. 1994).
11 In other words, the FHA would be used to combat arguments like those advanced in
Vicki Been with Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios?
A Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1
(1997); Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods:
Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics? 103 YALE L.J. 1383 (1994).
12 Laramore v. Illinois Sports Facilities Auth., 722 F. Supp. 443, 452 (N.D.llI.
1989)(challenging construction of baseball park in racial minority neighborhood).
13 See, e.g., Southend, supra note 7 at 1210. Interestingly, the Laramore court, supra
note 12, favorably cited Southend, but did not explore the apparent contradiction
between adopting a narrow reading of the section's language and Southend's sug-
gestion that 3604(b) protects "intangible" property interests.
14 Southend, supra note 7 at 1210 (citing Mackey v. Nationwide Insurance Cos., 724
F.2d 419, 423-424 (4th Cir. 1984).
15 See, e.g., McDiarmid v. Economy Fire and Casualty Co., 604 F. Supp. 105, 107-
108 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Oak Ridge Care Center Inc., v. Racine County, Wisconsin,
896 F. Supp. 867, 874-875 (E.D#Wisc. 1995) (contesting denial of operating per-
mit for rehabilitation treatment facility); Southend, supra note 7 at 1209-1210.
16 24 C.F.R. Section 100.65(b)(4). See also HUD Preamble 1, 53 Fed. Reg. 45001
(Nov. 7, 1988). Environmental justice advocates are well advised to study HUD
regulations, which tend to support a much more expansive reading of the FHA than
does much case law.
17 482 F. Supp. 673, 678 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd without opinion, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th
Cir. 1986).
18 Id. at 679-680.
19 Puglisi v. Underhill Park Taxpayer Assoc., 947 F. Supp. 673, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Contrast Schwemm, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION, supra note 5 at Section 13.4(3)(a)
n. 93.
20 See.e.g. Clifton Terrace Associates, Ltd. v. United Technologies Corp., 728 F. Supp.
24, 29 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd 929 F. 2d 714 (D.C.Cir. 1991).
21 Babin, supra note 8 at 346-348.
22 See, e.g. Ohana v. 180 Prospect Park Realty Corp., 996 F. Supp. 238 (E.D.N.Y
1988).
23 People Helpers Foundation, Inc. v. City of Richmond, 781 F. Supp 1132 (E.D. Va.
1992), 789 F. Supp.725 (E.D. Va. 1992) and 12 F.3d 1321 (4th Cir. 1993)(setting
aside injunctive and monetary relief on appeal).
24 United States v. City of Parma, Ohio, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1100 (N.D. Ohio 1980),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
926, 102 S. Ct. 1972, 72 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1982).
25 See Schwemm, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION, supra note 5 at Section 27.4 and 27.5.
Schwemm notes, however, that the Supreme Court has not foreclosed the possibil-
ity that a discriminatory effects standard may apply in Section 1982 cases.
26 It is easy to imagine the possibility of such claims given the increasing concern
about excessive air pollution in poor people of color neighborhoods. See, e.g.,
162 guild practitioner
Adam Nossiter, Asthma Common and on Rise in Crowded South Bronx, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 5, 1995, at Al, col. 1 (exploring possible connection between high asthma
rates and incinerator emissions); Hugh Hamilton, Uptown Eco-Blues: Environmen-
tal Woes in Harlem, THE CITY SUN, at A5-A7 (June 5-11, 1991) (asthma and par-
ticulates).
27 City of Memphis v. Greene. 451 U.S. 100 (1981) (finding that there was no such
restriction).
28 Vicki Been, Environmental Justice and Equity Issues, in ZONING AND LAND USE
CONTROLS Sec. 25D-05[2] (Patrick Rohan, ed., Matthew Bender 1995).
29 Jackson, supra note 10 at 1542.
30 Evans v. First Federal Savings Bank of Indiana, 669 F. Supp. 915, 919-920 (N.D.
Ind. 1987).
31 Houston v. City of Cocoa, 2 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending (P-H) Para. 15,625 (M.D.
Fla., Dec. 22, 1989).
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GUILD PRACTITIONER
"WE NEED JIMMY HIGGINS ... I believe in Jimmy
Higgins. I don't know how many of you come from trade union
backgrounds. I don't know how many have heard of Jimmy
Higgins. In a union, he's the man who passes out the leaflets
at six o'clock in the morning at the factory gate or puts up the
chairs before the meeting and takes them down afterwards. In
the Lawyers Guild, I think the Jimmy Higginses are the ones
who draft pleadings even when they can't sign their names to
them, who spend time in the library, who write memos and
briefs, who keep track of the subscribers to the Guild
Practitioner, who attend Guild chapter board meetings, who
raise funds and do all of the things that nobody enjoys doing.
The name is Jimmy Higgins, and I think we will always need
many Jimmy Higginses. There will never be enough to do these
things which are not normally considered important or
statusful. "
ANN FAGAN GINGER, in an article entitled "How Woman's Work is
Sometimes Done", in Volume 24, No. 4 (Fall 1965).
